Sunday, August 28, 2011

Rick Perry, Texas, BSE aka mad cow disease, CJD, and 12 years of lies there from

 
 










after john gummer force fed his daughter a mad cow burger trying to claim that UK beef was safe, some years laughter, his lies caught up to him ;



Family friend of John Gummer is killed by CJD aged 23 By ANDREW LEVY




Last updated at 19:16 11 October 2007







Elizabeth Smith: She learned on her 21st birthday that she had vCJD



A family friend of former Tory agriculture minister John Gummer has died from the human form of mad cow disease.



Elizabeth Smith died last week, more than two years after learning on her 21st birthday that she had new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.



Her father, retired vicar Roger Smith, is a friend of Mr Gummer, a former parishioner who famously attempted to allay fears about BSE in 1990 when he publicly fed a burger to his four-year-old daughter, Cordelia.



At the time, Mr Gummer said: "I can assure the public there is no cause for concern.



"The Government has taken all the advice it can from the experts. Their conclusion is that beef is perfectly safe."



University student Miss Smith quit her course days after the diagnosis in March 2005 and soon became so ill she needed round-the-clock treatment.



She was 23 when she died at her parents' home. Yesterday, they paid tribute to their "active and intelligent" daughter.



Mr Smith, of St Margaret South Elmham in Suffolk, said: "By the time she came home she had trouble swallowing and then couldn't swallow at all, so for the last two-and-a-half years she was fitted with a gastro-tube.



"After that the disease was remorseless in the way that it killed her off. She was unable to walk for the last two years of her life and couldn't speak or smile.



"Elizabeth had to be cared for 24 hours a day, seven days a week.



It's safe: John Gummer feeds his daughter Cordelia a burger



"She was more helpless for those last two years than when she was born - at least then she could move her arms and cry but by the end she couldn't even do that."



Describing her daughter's 21st birthday, Molly Smith said: "That was the worst time because we all had to cope with the fact that she was going to die.



"Elizabeth was clever, bright and intelligent. If she had been able to do her final exams she would have got a very good degree.



"She wanted to do primary school teaching and had a place on a postgraduate training course."



Miss Smith, who had a brother, Andrew, 39, passed four A-levels before going to Birmingham University in 2002 to read geography.



She first became ill in August 2004 but it was not until seven months later that she was told by doctors she had vCJD.



Mr Smith said yesterday that he was "99.9 per cent certain" that his daughter's illness had been caused by contaminated beef.



But he refused to blame Mr Gummer, saying the episode with the burger had not changed the way he viewed meat.



He added: "One of the few comforting thoughts is that almost certainly Elizabeth's degree of awareness in the last two years of her life was minimal. Some doctors would say that vCJD is far more painful to watch than suffer."



Miss Smith was the 162nd person to die from new variant CJD, which was first identified in 1996 after being linked to an outbreak of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) in cattle. vCJD slowly destroys the brain, giving it a sponge-like appearance.



It is thought to be caused by the build up in the brain of an abnormal form of the naturally occurring prion protein.



Most cases have developed as a result of eating infected meat, although five victims have been vegetarians. The disease has also been transmitted by blood transfusion and infected surgical equipment.



Mr Gummer was not available for comment yesterday.







http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-487074/Family-friend-John-Gummer-killed-CJD-aged-23.html

 
 

 


Rick Perry, Texas, BSE aka mad cow disease, CJD, and 12 years of lies there from



Greetings,



I am sure that most of you are aware of the Texas mad cow cases that were covered up. the 1st documented cover-up was successful, the second documented case of mad cow in Texas would have been successful, but after literally, an act of Congress to override Austin, Texas officials (rick perry), only after the Honorable Fong of the OIG, and scientist all over the world, and a few others, including myself wrote to the OIG about said cover-up, and 7 months later, did they finally retest that covered-up highly suspect mad cow, and said covered up mad cow was finally _confirmed_ by Weybridge as a confirmed Texas BSE mad cow case. this 7 months after the fact on a Government BSE REDBOOK regulations of a 48 turn around on said test. over course this was all done for a reason, the BSE MRR policy was being put into place while all this was going on, and Heaven forbid if rick perry would have had a confirmed BSE mad cow case while those regulations were over riding the BSE GBR risk assessments. however, during all this political science on mad cow disease, it was nothing more than a crap shoot, and 15 years later, we now know that some of the sporadic CJD cases are indeed tied to the atypical BSE cases here in North America. How many people during the Bush/Perry era, how many did they needlessly expose to mad cow disease? how many will go clinical and die in the decades to come? Whether or not you dare care, during the Bush/Perry era, they exposed our kids to mad cow disease, by feeding them dead stock downer cows via the NSLP, for over 4 years. DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS ARE THE MOST HIGH RISK COW FOR MAD COW DISEASE. WHO will watch the children for the next 5 decades for CJD ???


Rick Perry, Texas, BSE aka mad cow disease, CJD, and 15 years of lies there from


FRIDAY April 5, 1996

Cookout Serves Up Praise of U.S. Beef Los Angeles Times (LT) - FRIDAY April 5, 1996 State agriculture officials, undaunted by the mad cow scare sweeping Europe, held an impromptu cookout to hail the safety of U.S. beef. Munching on smoked brisket at a popular barbecue spot in Austin, Texas Agriculture Commissioner Rick Perry criticized the media for stoking fears among domestic beef consumers. The agricultural commissioner said evidence that bovine spongiform encephalopothy, known as BSE, will cause human brain disorders was "circumstantial" and that the issue has been politicized in Britain and Europe.

Separately, the U.S. beef industry is considering as an option a promotional campaign in Europe touting American beef as free of the disease, an export official said. "We'll look at all the options, and that'd certainly be one of them on the table," said Thad Lively, economist at the U.S. Meat Export Federation, an association of U.S. meat exporters based in Denver.

http://www.mad-cow.org/~tom/US_beef_sum.html#Cookout


Texas AG won't sue Howard Lyman over mad cow remarks

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUSTIN, Texas (May 2, 1996 7:11 p.m. EDT)

-- Attorney General Dan Morales on Thursday rejected Agriculture Commissioner Rick Perry's request to use the state's new "veggie libel" law to go after a vegetarian who said mad cow disease could affect America's beef supply.

Though Morales labeled the comments "baloney," he said the law does not allow the state to file suit under the law approved last year by lawmakers to protect against people who make false claims about the safety of food products. Any such lawsuit would have to be filed by a private individual who feels his or her products have been unfairly disparaged, Morales said.

At issue are remarks made during an April 19 appearance on "The Oprah Winfrey Show" by Howard Lyman of Maryland, a former cattle rancher now with the Eating with Conscience Campaign, a project of the Humane Society of America. Lyman said on the show that mad cow disease "will make AIDS look like the common cold," and that the livestock industry is feeding "road kill" to cattle. A day later, cattle futures plummeted on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.

Perry was enraged, and urged Morales to file suit against Lyman.

Can't do, said Morales, who also recommended a lower-key response to Lyman.

"Mr. Lyman's statements should be taken for what they are -- baloney," he told Perry. "The more public attention focused upon his outrageous claims, the greater the prospects for real harm being done to our beef industry. I suggest we simply ignore this foolishness."

Perry said he was disappointed in Morales' response.

"The letters and phone calls the Texas Department of Agriculture has received from folks who make their living from the land and who are suffering from these false statements tell us that they support our efforts to stop the inaccuracies and innuendo about our $6 billion industry," he said.

Mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) has been detected in cattle in Great Britain, but it has not been diagnosed in Texas. Perry and other agriculture officials say there is no scientific link between mad cow disease and the human disease (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease) that killed several Britons.

Copyright © 1996 Nando.net Copyright © 1996 Cox News Service

http://www.mad-cow.org/~tom/free_speech.html#fut


Gov. Perry Responds to Mad Cow Confirmation

AUSTIN – Gov. Rick Perry issued the following statement concerning confirmation from the USDA that a single cow in Texas has tested positive for BSE or Mad Cow:

“I want to urge calm and reassure the public that they can have the highest confidence in our beef supply, and the safeguards we have in place to protect the public from the spread of BSE. I, for one, will continue to eat red meat, and intend to do so later tonight with complete confidence it is safe to do so.”

“We have had plans in place for more than a decade to address a confirmed case of Mad Cow disease to ensure it is contained and kept out of the food supply. Working with federal officials, all precautions are being taken to protect the public.”

“We have been given no specific information from USDA on the origin of the cow that tested positive for BSE other than it came from a Texas herd.”

http://www.kcbd.com/story/3538951/gov-perry-responds-to-mad-cow-confirmation


Statement of Gov. Rick Perry on BSE Announcement

Thursday, June 30, 2005 • Press Release

AUSTIN – Gov. Rick Perry issued the following statement today on the announcement by the U.S. Department of Agriculture that a cow recently tested for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy – commonly known as mad cow disease – is from a Texas herd.

“I want to urge calm and reassure the public that they can have the highest confidence in our beef supply, and the safeguards we have in place to protect the public from the spread of BSE. There is not, nor has there ever been, a known instance of BSE contaminating the food supply in Texas or anywhere else in the United States.

The animal in question was not processed into food or any other product. Texans can be sure that the beef they buy at their local supermarkets or restaurants is as safe today as it was yesterday, and I encourage Texans to continue to enjoy Texas beef products.”

http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/3287/



Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls

In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test, Bio-Rad Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), produced an inconclusive BSE test result as part of its enhanced BSE surveillance program. The ELISA rapid screening test performed at a BSE contract laboratory produced three high positive reactive results.40 As required,41 the contract laboratory forwarded the inconclusive sample to the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for confirmatory testing. NVSL repeated the ELISA testing and again produced three high positive reactive results.42 In accordance with its established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. In addition, NVSL performed a histological43 examination of the tissue and did not detect lesions44 consistent with BSE.

Faced with conflicting results, NVSL scientists recommended additional testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded no further testing was necessary because testing protocols were followed. In our discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision not to do additional testing because the IHC is internationally recognized as the "gold standard." Also, they believed that conducting additional tests would undermine confidence in USDA’s established testing protocols.

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf



USDA orders silence on mad cow in Texas

Susan Combs by no means has public and consumer health at heart while she is protecting the cattle industry. She is oblivious to mad cow disease. Her soul purpose is to protect the cattle industry at all cost, including my mothers life (DOD 12/14/97), or maybe one of your family members from any strain of mad cow disease in TEXAS. SHE helped cover-up mad cow disease in TEXAS both on that inconclusive that was positive so many times it will make your head spin. PLUS, the other mad cow in TEXAS they rendered without testing at all, that came from the top out of Austin. THEY should be tried for murder. corporate homicide is what i call it. they knew for years, but kept on keeping on.

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html


Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf


Texas BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report August 2005

Executive Summary

In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

Background of the Investigation

On June 10, 2005, USDA announced that the November 2004 inconclusive BSE sample tested positive on SAF immunoblot. The SAF immunoblot was run at USDA’s National Animal Disease Center (NADC) upon the recommendation of USDA’s Office of the Inspector General. Samples were sent to a World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) reference laboratory for BSE in Weybridge, England, for confirmatory tests. Farm A, located in Texas, was the suspected farm of origin for the index cow and was placed under hold order on June 20, 2005 pending confirmation of the positive results and DNA analysis of the herd. Weybridge confirmed the BSE positive on June 24, 2005. The carcass of the index cow had been disposed of by incineration in November 2004.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf


News Release

Texas Animal Health Commission

Box l2966 * Austin, Texas 78711 * (800) 550-8242 * FAX (512) 719-0719

Bob Hillman, DVM * Executive Director

For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000388/!x-usc:mailto:ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us

For immediate release---

State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case

The US Department of Agriculture announced June 29 that genetic testing has verified that an aged cow that tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or BSE originated from a Texas beef cattle herd. Tissues for laboratory testing were initially collected from the animal in November 2004, and the carcass was incinerated and did not enter the human food, animal feed or fertilizer supply system. While tests in November indicated the animal did not have BSE, retesting in England in June confirmed the animal had the disease. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency, and USDA have jointly assigned a state-federal team to conduct the epidemiological investigation and response.

“The TAHC and US Department of Agriculture’s Veterinary Services are working with a complement of experts from federal and state animal health, food safety, public health and feed regulatory agencies to ensure the continued safety and wholesomeness of our meat supply,” said Dr. Bob Hillman, Texas state veterinarian and executive director of the TAHC, the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency. “Epidemiological investigations are thorough and focus on verifying the herd of origin, and when, where and how the animal and potentially, any herd mates, were exposed to the abnormal prion, or disease agent, that causes BSE. Additionally, epidemiology investigations trace the infected animal’s movement and herd mates. Animals potentially exposed to the disease will be depopulated, with proper disposal. The animals will not be introduced into the human or animal food chain.”

The USDA’s BSE testing protocol requires testing of emaciated or injured cattle, cattle that exhibit central nervous system disorder, cattle unable to rise or to walk normally, and cattle that die of unknown causes. Since June 1, 2004, brain tissue samples from more than 394,000 cattle have been tested in the U.S. and were negative for BSE. Of those, 38,320 were tested in Texas, Dr. Hillman noted. BSE surveillance has been conducted in the U.S. since l990.

The U.S. has taken preventive measures against the introduction of BSE since l989, when prohibitions were placed on cattle and other ruminants from BSE-affected countries, noted Dr. Hillman. In 1997, the importation ban was extended to all of Europe.

Dr. Hillman said the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997 banned the use of ruminant-derived protein (from animals such as cattle and sheep) in feed for cattle and other ruminants. There is no evidence that BSE spreads from live animal to animal in the herd, but cattle can be exposed by eating feed that contains rendered protein from infected animals. “These measures taken by the USDA and the FDA are safeguards that work to protect livestock, and ultimately, our meat supply,” he said.

--30--

http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf


Second BSE case occurred in Texas, USDA says Jun 30, 2005 (CIDRAP News) – The United States' second case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was in a 12-year-old cow that came from a Texas herd and would have been made into pet food if it hadn't been flagged for BSE testing, federal officials announced yesterday evening.

US Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials said the cow was to be processed at a pet food plant in Waco, Tex., when it was diverted for testing because it couldn't walk. Officials didn't name the plant or say exactly where the cow came from. But an Associated Press (AP) report today identified the plant as Champion Pet Food in Waco and said the cow was already dead when brought there last November.

"The source herd is now under a hold order as we identify animals of interest within the herd," USDA Chief Veterinarian John Clifford said in a prepared statement. Investigators will look for cattle born within a year before or after the BSE-infected cow and any of the cow's offspring born within the past 2 years, he explained.

"If the age of the animal cannot be pinpointed, then we may expand our inquiry to include all animals in this herd before the feed ban went into place in 1997," Clifford said. To prevent BSE, the government banned putting cattle protein into cattle feed in August 1997.

The infected cow was incinerated, and no parts were used in human food or animal feed, according to the USDA. "The safety of our food supply is not in question," Clifford stated.

Because of the cow's age, the USDA suspects it became infected by eating contaminated feed before the government ban began in 1997. The USDA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will try to trace the source herd's feed history, officials said.

The FDA will also check whether firms that may have processed meat-and-bone meal from animals from that herd have complied with the 1997 feed ban, Dr. Steve Sundlof, director of the FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine, said at a news conference last night.

The Texas case is the first US BSE case in a native-born animal; Clifford said the cow lived on one farm all its life. The previous US case, found in December 2003, involved a Canadian-born dairy cow in Washington state.

An initial screening test on the Texas cow last November was inconclusive, and two confirmatory immunohistochemistry tests were negative. But early this month the USDA's inspector general ordered a Western blot test, which came back positive. Further confirmatory tests at an international reference lab in Britain were also positive, prompting the USDA to announce the findings last week.

The USDA waited for the results of DNA tests before announcing that the infected cow came from Texas. The step was necessary because parts of the infected cow were stored with those of four other cattle, causing some uncertainty, officials said.

"We felt that we had the correct herd; we wanted to identify that appropriately with DNA," Clifford said at the news conference. Investigators analyzed DNA from the infected animal and then looked for relatives in the presumed source herd by analyzing DNA from members of the herd, he said. The investigation turned up two cattle that are related to the infected cow, he added.

The AP report said Champion Pet Food is under contract to take samples from animals in poor health. The company's owner, Benjy Bauer, told the AP that his workers took samples from the cow and sent them to the Texas Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory at Texas A&M University. The lab is one of several the USDA uses to screen cattle for BSE, the story said.

See also:

USDA news release http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/BSE_statement6-29-05.pdf


USDA fact sheet on BSE epidemiologic investiation

http://www.usda.gov/documents/FactSheetbse062905.pdf


USDA press conference transcript

https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/june3005bse.html


THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:

Analysis: What that mad cow means

By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.

Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.

"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.

However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.

"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.

Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.

"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."

The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.

The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."

USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.

Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.

"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.

"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.

UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.

Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.

Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.

"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r


http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/


CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm


PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html


OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf



FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA



Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms


On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

#

http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm



SEE FULL TEXT OF ALL THIS HERE ;

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html



ALABAMA MAD COW CASE

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse/news/alabama_cow_031506.htm


Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY



(see COPIOUS AMOUNTS OF mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html


Texas BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report August 2005

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf


State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case


JUNE 30, 2005

(please note 7+ month delay in final confirmation so the BSE MRR policy could be set in stone first. $$$...tss)

http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf


https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/june3005bse.html




SEE ATTEMPTED COVER-UP BEFORE THE END AROUND BY FONG ET AL OF THE O.I.G


The U.S. Department of Agriculture confirmed June 29 that genetic testing had verified bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease) in a 12-year-old cow that was born and raised in a Texas beef cattle herd.

Subsequent epidemiological investigations resulted in the culling and testing of 67 adult animals from the index herd. Bio-Rad tests for BSE were conducted on all 67 animals by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa. All tests were negative.

On July 12, Texas officials lifted the quarantine on the source herd. At press time, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service was tracing animals of the same age that had left the ranch.

Timeline

The BSE-positive animal was a Brahman-cross cow born and raised in a single Texas herd. The location of the ranch was not disclosed.

On Nov. 11, 2004, the 12-year-old cow was taken to a Texas auction market. Because of its condition, the cow was sent to Champion Pet Foods in Waco, Texas. The company produces several blends of dog food, primarily for the greyhound industry.

On Nov. 15, the animal arrived dead at Champion. Under procedures established by USDA's intensive surveillance program, a sample was sent to the USDA-approved Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Testing Laboratory (TVMDL) at Texas A&M University.

Between June 1, 2004, and June 1, 2005, TVMDL tested nearly 34,000 samples from Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas and Louisiana. They tested the sample from Champion on Nov. 19 using a Bio-Rad ELISA rapid test for BSE. Initial results were inconclusive.

Because of the inconclusive results, a representative from USDA took the entire carcass to TVMDL where it was incinerated. USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) began tracing the animal and herd.

The sample was then sent to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory for further testing. Two Immunohistochemistry (IHC) tests were conducted and both were negative for BSE. At that point APHIS stopped their trace.

USDA scientists also ran an additional, experimental IHC "rapid" tissue fixation test for academic purposes. This test has not been approved internationally.

Some abnormalities were noted in the experimental test, but because the two approved tests came back negative, the results were not reported beyond the laboratory.

Monitoring by OIG

USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been monitoring implementation of the BSE expanded surveillance program and evaluating the following:

* Effectiveness of the surveillance program;

* Performance of BSE laboratories in complying with policies and procedures for conducting tests and reporting results;

* Enforcement of the ban on specified risk materials in meat products;

* Controls to prevent central nervous system tissue in advanced meat recovery products;

* Ante mortem condemnation procedures; and

* Procedures for obtaining brain tissue samples from condemned cattle.

While reviewing voluminous records, OIG auditors noticed conflicting test results on one sample-rapid inconclusive, IHC negative, experimental reactive.

Sample retested

At the recommendation of the Inspector General, the sample was retested during the week of June 5 with a second confirmatory test, the Western Blot. The results were reactive.

USDA scientists then conducted an additional IHC confirmatory test, using different antibodies from the November 2004 test. On Friday, June 10, Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns publicly announced the results as a "weak positive."

On June 16 an official with USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory hand-carried samples for further testing to the Veterinary Laboratory Agency (VLA) in Weybridge, England. Since 1991, the VLA has been a BSE reference laboratory for the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).

Experts from the Weybridge lab confirmed the accuracy of the results of USDA's November confirmatory IHC test, concurring that the case could not have been confirmed on the basis of this sample. They also examined the November experimental IHC test and interpreted the results to be positive.

Weybridge also conducted additional tests, including IHC, OIE-prescribed Western Blot, NaTTA Western Blot and Prionics Western Blot tests.

To better understand the conflicting results, USDA also conducted Bio-Rad and IDEXX rapid screening tests, IHC and OIE-prescribed Western Blot. USDA also used DNA sequencing to determine the prion protein gene sequence of the animal.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5420/is_200508/ai_n21377094


Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.

http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf


48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS



-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us

Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx

Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST

In Reply to:

Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results

posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:

Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected. just pondering... TSS

MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004. ...TSS


-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Carla EverettReferences: [log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask] ;

Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?

I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...

can you confirm??? terry

============================================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References;[log in to unmask];

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.

Carla

At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:

Greetings Carla,

i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from

TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?

thank you,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr

======================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us><[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]us> <[log in to unmask]>

our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.

At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,

you wrote:

why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:

November 22: Press Release title here

star image More BSE information

terry

Carla Everett wrote:

no confirmation on the U.S.'inconclusive test...

no confirmation on location of animal. ;


FROM HERE, IT TOOK 7 MONTHS TO CONFIRM THIS MAD COW, while the BSE MRR policy was being bought and sold...(in my opinion...tss)

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/


Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html



TEXAS OFFICIALS DEAD WRONG ON AMOUNT OF INFECTIVITY TO CAUSE A TSE PRION DISEASE ;



"FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams – approximately a quarter ounce — of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds."



5.5 GRAMS OF INFECTIOUS PROHIBITED MAD COW FEED FOR EACH OF THE 1,222 ANIMALS (5.5 GRAMS X 1,222 ANIMALS) IS ENOUGH INFECTIOUS MAD COW FEED TO KILL A SMALL HERD OF COWS...TSS


U.S. Food and Drug Administration FDA News | Today the Food and Drug Administ…U.S. Food and Drug Administration FDA News

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle — a violation of FDA’s 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams – approximately a quarter ounce — of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA’s Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, “The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE.”

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

http://www.usmef.org/news-statistics/press-releases/us-food-and-drug-administration-fda-news-today-the-food-and-drug-administ-13375/


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html


PRION 2009 CONGRESS BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

O.4.3

Spread of BSE prions in cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) after oral transmission

Edgar Holznagel1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Barbara Yutzy1, Gerhard Hunsmann3, Johannes Loewer1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Federal Institute for Sera and Vaccines, Germany; 2Department of Neuropathology, Georg-August University, Göttingen, Germany, 3Department of Virology and Immunology, German Primate Centre, Göttingen, Germany

Background: BSE-infected cynomolgus monkeys represent a relevant animal model to study the pathogenesis of variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD).

Objectives: To study the spread of BSE prions during the asymptomatic phase of infection in a simian animal model.

Methods: Orally BSE-dosed macaques (n=10) were sacrificed at defined time points during the incubation period and 7 orally BSE-dosed macaques were sacrificed after the onset of clinical signs. Neuronal and non-neuronal tissues were tested for the presence of proteinase-K-resistant prion protein (PrPres) by western immunoblot and by paraffin-embedded tissue (PET) blot technique.

Results: In clinically diseased macaques (5 years p.i. + 6 mo.), PrPres deposits were widely spread in neuronal tissues (including the peripheral sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system) and in lymphoid tissues including tonsils. In asymptomatic disease carriers, PrPres deposits could be detected in intestinal lymph nodes as early as 1 year p.i., but CNS tissues were negative until 3 – 4 years p.i. Lumbal/sacral segments of the spinal cord and medulla oblongata were PrPres positive as early as 4.1 years p.i., whereas sympathetic trunk and all thoracic/cervical segments of the spinal cord were still negative for PrPres. However, tonsil samples were negative in all asymptomatic cases.

Discussion: There is evidence for an early spread of BSE to the CNS via autonomic fibres of the splanchnic and vagus nerves indicating that trans-synaptical spread may be a time-limiting factor for neuroinvasion. Tonsils were predominantly negative during the main part of the incubation period indicating that epidemiological vCJD screening results based on the detection of PrPres in tonsil biopsies may mostly tend to underestimate the prevalence of vCJD among humans.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf


P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf


Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf


look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;



Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa


Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose


It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://web.archive.org/web/20061003022720/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf


6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://web.archive.org/web/20061003022724/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf


Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque


"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html



Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

snip...

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...


http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf



2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156


http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF


her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine–human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.

Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA

NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7233/full/4571079b.html


Thursday, June 23, 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/experimental-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html


Saturday, July 23, 2011

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/cattle-heads-with-tonsils-beef-tongues.html


Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html


Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129



P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf


SOME OLD MAD COW FEED BAN VIOLATIONS ;

THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf



WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

Finally spoke with ;

Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem to keep having.

X was very very cautious as to speak directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB.

X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation of some sort.

X would only speak of what other countries do, and that i should take that as an answer.

I told X I understood that it was a very loaded question and X agreed several times over and even said a political one.

my question;

Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive, without WB, and considering the new atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???

ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not want any of this recorded or repeated.

again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of retaliation, but again said X tell me what other countries are doing and finding, and that i should take it from there.

"very difficult to answer"

"very political"

"very loaded question"

outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech.

in house WB, SAF, along with IHC, HP, several times etc.

you should see at several talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS NEGATIVE.

again, look what the rest of the world is doing.

said something about Dr. Houston stating; any screening assay, always a chance for human error. but with so many errors (i am assuming X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false positives?

said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were positive''. ...

TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Your questions

Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800

From: To: flounder@wt.net

Hi Terry:

............................................snip

Let me know your phone number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test. Thank you

Regards

Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email:

=================================

END...TSS

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



HOW ABOUT THAT MAD COW FIRE WALL TOO ;

*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS

THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$



10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007


Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm



Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY


*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)


BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html


PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,

Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html


MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

a) Bulk

b) None

c) Bulk

d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html


please see full text ;

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html


http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/EnforcementStoryArchive/ucm107472.htm



http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm048448.htm


http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02183.pdf


http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm048431.htm


http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/UCM055628.pdf


http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/ucm106105.htm


http://agri.state.nv.us/GAO_FDA%20Mgmt%20Mad%20Cow%20IMprove_Feb05.pdf


http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-101


http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05101.pdf


http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm115008.htm


http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm048228.htm


Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html


FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008

Greetings,

AS you can see from this OAI, dated 05/10/2008, the potential for banned mad cow protein still being fed to U.S. cattle is great. I did a quick search, and this was a TEXAS firm (the last two documented mad cows in the USA were atypical BSE, one being from TEXAS, and science is showing that atypical BSE is more virulent to humans). WHAT I find odd, is how difficult it is now to look up these violators of these mad cow feed ban violations. Apparently the spread sheet is still not available (full text) ;

Display Entire FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firm Inventory Report as an Excel Spreadsheet

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/BSEInspect/bse_excel.jsp



HOWEVER, if you look hard enough, yea shall find, potential mad cow protein in commerce USA MAY 2008 ;

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 05/10/2008

Search by: State = TX, and FDA District = DAL-DO, and Firm Type = FR,HF,NL, and Last BSE Insp Date From 01/01/2007 To 05/31/2008 and BSE Program Risk = DP,HP,NP, and Last BSE District Decision = OAI, and Handles Feed for Rum. Animals = Y,N,R Sort by: Last BSE District Decision

FDA District

DAL-DO

Firm Id (FEI)

3006607060

Firm Name

Texas Legend Ranch

Street Address

2803 Highway 473

City

Kendalia

State

TX

Zip Code

78027-2016

Opr. Status

OPR

Firm Type(s)

FR, OF

Prgm Risk

NP

Last BSE Insp Date

03/25/2008

Last BSE Dist. Dcsn''

OAI

Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

Y

Legend - Opr.Status:OPR=Operational,

SEA=Seasonal,

PRP=Pre-Production,

Firm Type:

AF=Animal Feed/Pet Food Salvager,

DR=Distributor/Retailer,

FL=Feed Mill (FDA Licensed),

FR=Feeder of Ruminants,

HF=Human Food Processor,

NL=Feed Mill (not FDA Licensed),

OF=On-farm Feed Mixer,

OT=Other,

PB=Protein Blender,

PF=Pet Food Manufacturer,

RE=Renderer,

RO=Feeder of Ruminants and Other Species,

TH=Transporter (Hauler),

Prgm Risk:DP=Only Distributes Prohib.Mat.(DP),

HP=Handles Prohibited Materials(HP),

NP=Does not handle Prohib.Mat.(NP),

Dist Dcsn:

OAI=Official Action Indicated (OAI),

VAI=Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI),

NAI=No Action Indicated (NAI),

RTS=Referred to State (RTS),

** District decisions listed in this report reflect the compliance status of firms when the report was generated. These district decisions may or may not represent the final Agency determination of compliance for these firms.

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/BSEInspect/bse_results.jsp



PLEASE NOTE ;

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/CVM_Updates/BSE0108.htm


PLEASE SEE ;

Unacceptable risk: When the potential harm either to animal or humans from a feed product attains a level not acceptable to decision-makers. The level may vary depending on the type of harm.

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/AFSS3rdDraftFramework.html


Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html


Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html


C O N F I R M E D

----- Original Message -----

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To:

Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM

Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html


PLEASE UNDERSTAND, with a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, once clinical, the disease is 100% fatal. There should be NO debate of the 'unacceptable risk factor', with any TSE. ...TSS


Sunday, June 26, 2011


Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html




PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, during the BUSH/PERRY era, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation (including TEXAS) dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens. who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???

DID rick perry and george bush expose your child to mad cow disease via the NSLP ???


SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE


http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/who-will-watch-children.html


http://downercattle.blogspot.com/



DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???


you can check and see here ;


http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/pdf/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf



with an incubation period of up to 50 years or more, we will all just have to wait and see...


Subject: USDA BSE inconclusive MRR policy

Date: August 25, 2006 at 3:52 pm PST

USDA BSE inconclusive MRR policy

BESIDES THE TEXAS MAD COW THAT WAS RENDERED AND NEVER TESTED;

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html



Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html



Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html



Friday, February 18, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS ''PLEADS GUILTY"

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/02/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html



Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html



i wonder if CFIA Canada uses the same OBEX ONLY diagnostic criteria as the USDA ?


Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html



Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY



(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html



Saturday, December 18, 2010

OIE Global Conference on Wildlife Animal Health and Biodiversity - Preparing for the Future (TSE AND PRIONS) Paris (France), 23-25 February 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/12/oie-global-conference-on-wildlife.html




Saturday, August 20, 2011

BSE PRION Terrestrial Animal Health - Policy & Procedures / Santé des animaux terrestres - politiques et procédures 2011-08-16

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/bse-prion-terrestrial-animal-health.html




IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



Thursday, July 28, 2011

An Update on the Animal Disease Traceability Framework July 27, 2011

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2011/07/update-on-animal-disease-traceability.html




Wednesday, June 15, 2011


Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/galveston-texas-isle-port-moves-through.html




Thursday, June 2, 2011

USDA scrapie report for April 2011 NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASES Pennsylvania AND California

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/usda-scrapie-report-for-april-2011-new.html


Monday, June 20, 2011 2011

Annual Conference of the National Institute for Animal Agriculture ATYPICAL NOR-98 LIKE SCRAPIE UPDATE USA

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/2011-annual-conference-of-national.html


Monday, June 27, 2011

Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html


Monday, November 30, 2009

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html



I strenuously urge the USDA and the OIE et al to revoke the exemption of the legal global trading of atypical Nor-98 scrapie TSE. ...TSS



Friday, February 11, 2011

Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html


Thursday, July 14, 2011

Histopathological Studies of “CH1641-Like” Scrapie Sources Versus Classical Scrapie and BSE Transmitted to Ovine Transgenic Mice (TgOvPrP4)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/histopathological-studies-of-ch1641.html


Thursday, November 18, 2010

Increased susceptibility of human-PrP transgenic mice to bovine spongiform encephalopathy following passage in sheep

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/increased-susceptibility-of-human-prp.html


Sunday, October 3, 2010

Scrapie, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, and BSE in sheep and goats North America, who's looking ?

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/10/scrapie-nor-98-atypical-scrapie-and-bse.html


Wednesday, July 06, 2011

Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation



(see tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce USA...tss)


http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/swine-are-susceptible-to-chronic.html


Monday, June 27, 2011

Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/06/zoonotic-potential-of-cwd-experimental.html


Please see the following warning from CDC about prion TSE consumption in North America ;


Thursday, May 26, 2011

Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey

Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/travel-history-hunting-and-venison.html


Thursday, July 21, 2011

A Second Case of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease Linked to the G131V Mutation in the Prion Protein Gene in a Dutch Patient Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology:

August 2011 - Volume 70 - Issue 8 - pp 698-702

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/second-case-of-gerstmann-straussler.html



Saturday, March 5, 2011



MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html



Sunday, August 21, 2011

The British disease, or a disease gone global, The TSE Prion Disease

snip...

CANADA CJD UPDATE 2011

CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20112 As of January 31, 2011

3. Final classification of 49 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 is pending.

snip...

http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/hcai-iamss/cjd-mcj/cjdss-ssmcj/pdf/stats_0111-eng.pdf


USA 2011

USA

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

Cases Examined1

(November 1, 2010)

Year Total Referrals2 Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD

1996  earlier 51 33 28 5 0 0

1997 114 68 59 9 0 0

1998 87 51 43 7 1 0

1999 121 73 65 8 0 0

2000 146 103 89 14 0 0

2001 209 119 109 10 0 0

2002 248 149 125 22 2 0

2003 274 176 137 39 0 0

2004 325 186 164 21 0 13

2005 344 194 157 36 1 0

2006 383 197 166 29 0 24

2007 377 214 187 27 0 0

2008 394 231 205 25 0 0

2009 425 258 215 43 0 0

2010 333 213 158 33 0 0

TOTAL 38315 22656 1907 328 4 3

1 Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on year of referral;

2 Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue and/or blood (in familial cases) were submitted;

3 Disease acquired in the United Kingdom;

4 Disease was acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi Arabia in the other case;

5 Includes 18 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases;

6 Includes 23 (22 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf


Please notice where sporadic CJD cases in 1996 went from 28 cases, to 215 cases in 2009, the highest recorded year to date.

sporadic CJD is on a steady rise, and has been since 1996.

I also urge you to again notice these disturbing factors in lines 5 and 6 ;

5 Includes 18 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases;

6 Includes 23 (22 from 2010) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

========end=====tss=====2011


snip...



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/british-disease-or-disease-gone-global.html



CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER


"Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle."

http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html



CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER


http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html



SEE TEXAS CJD CASES HERE ;



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/cjd-2-cases-mclennan-county-texas.html


http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/



SEE CJD IN TEXAS UNDER REPORTED HERE ;


http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&sqi=2&ved=0CCMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dshs.state.tx.us%2Fidcu%2Fepilink%2Fvolume_64%2Fissue_8%2Fdocs%2F640804.pdf&rct=j&q=texas%20CREUTZFELDT%20JAKOB%20DISEASE&ei=Gg9YTrvwEaqusQKX3eWvDA&usg=AFQjCNGY2P9WX5PAuaSUJ0FhndFVlCjYVQ&sig2=I5s3rSEP7-ULzYQqvxp_8w



Thursday, August 4, 2011

Terry Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis, Date aired: 27 Jun 2011



(see video here) ;


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/terry-singeltary-sr-on-creutzfeldt.html




Sunday, August 21, 2011

The British disease, or a disease gone global, The TSE Prion Disease



(see video here)


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/british-disease-or-disease-gone-global.html



Thursday, July 08, 2010

GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW 2010

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/global-clusters-of-creutzfeldt-jakob.html




Friday, June 17, 2011

Treatable neurological disorders misdiagnosed as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/06/treatable-neurological-disorders.html




Friday, November 30, 2007

CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/2007/11/cjd-questionnaire.html



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/




Wednesday, August 24, 2011

There Is No Safe Dose of Prions

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/there-is-no-safe-dose-of-prions.html




Wednesday, August 24, 2011

All Clinically-Relevant Blood Components Transmit Prion Disease following a Single Blood Transfusion: A Sheep Model of vCJD

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/all-clinically-relevant-blood.html




Wednesday, June 29, 2011

TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-meeting-august-1-2011-donor.html




Saturday, June 18, 2011

Self-propagation and transmission of misfolded mutant SOD1 Prion or Prion-like phenomenon?

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/self-propagation-and-transmission-of.html



Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE.

When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.



http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2



Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/



Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee

The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric, epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of diseases.49

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf



The conclusions state that, at present, the only TSE agent demonstrated to be zoonotic is the classical BSE agent. Active screening has allowed the identification of 3 new forms of animal TSEs (H-type atypical BSE, L-type atypical BSE, and atypical scrapie), but the information obtained has major limitations due to the unknown sensitivity of the current monitoring system for these TSEs. There is no epidemiological evidence to suggest that classical scrapie is zoonotic. The epidemiological data are too limited to conclude whether the atypical scrapie agent has a zoonotic potential. Transmission experiments to human PrP transgenic mice or primates suggest that some TSE agents other than the classical BSE agent in cattle (namely L-type atypical BSE, classical BSE in sheep, TME, CWD agents) might have zoonotic potential and indicate that that of the L-type atypical BSE agent appears similar or even higher than that of the classical BSE agent. A single study reported efficient transmission of a natural sheep classical scrapie isolate to primates.

Commentary ---------- Following to a request from the European Commission, the Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) were asked to deliver a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in animals and humans. The opinion reviews and discusses the existing scientific evidence that links animal and human TSEs currently known.

The opinion first considers the definition of zoonoses and the principles for the identification of zoonotic diseases, which can be based on evidence gathered from both epidemiological and laboratory studies. The opinion describes the challenges involved in identifying TSEs as zoonoses, due to the specific characteristics of TSE infections/diseases, such as the nature of TSE agents, the occurrence of animal and human TSEs, and the type of monitoring applied, the long incubation period of TSEs etc. The example of the process that led to establishing a link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) is reviewed. The epidemiological and laboratory criteria that can be used to investigate such a link are described in detail, since those criteria might be useful for the identification of links between other animal and human TSEs.

The opinion discusses the strain diversity of the TSE agents described in sheep, goats, cattle, cervids, and humans, based on the current knowledge, which highlights that multiple TSE agents exist in each species. The factors influencing the capacity of TSE agents to cross the species transmission barrier are then considered in detail, including the variability in host and donor PrP gene and protein, the TSE strain type involved and its interaction with the host PrP, and the route of infection.

The opinion critically assesses the tools and methodologies currently available to study and evaluate the possible association between animal and human TSEs. The use of epidemiology is discussed for TSEs in both animals and humans, and the possibility to compare the 2 sources of information is presented as a possible method to study the possible links.

Both in vivo and in vitro laboratory methods are considered and discussed, including neuropathology, transmission experiments involving different animal models (wild type and transgenic mice, primates and other species), biochemical methods, cell-free conversion assays, protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), and cell culture assays. Characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of the different methods are reviewed, including the opportunity to collate data from different types of experiments for the study of potential associations between animal and human TSEs.

The opinion then reviews the scientific evidence currently available for the different animal and human TSEs, including classical BSE, atypical BSE (H-type and L-type), classical scrapie, atypical scrapie, chronic wasting disease (CWD), transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME), and human TSEs. In particular, the following aspects are systematically discussed for each TSE agent: epidemiology, pathogenesis, and in vivo and in vitro transmission experiments.

The opinion concludes that, at present, the only TSE agent demonstrated to be zoonotic is the classical BSE agent. With regard to human TSEs, detected cases of sporadic CJD are randomly distributed in time and geographical location. These observations have been interpreted as a supportive argument that sporadic CJD is not environmentally acquired. However, the epidemiological evidence in relation to sporadic CJD cannot be regarded as definitive, and the possibility that a small proportion of cases are zoonotic cannot be excluded.

It also concludes that a series of uncertainties in relation to the epidemiological patterns of animal and human TSEs indicate that even a rough comparison of the present epidemiological patterns of human and animal TSEs other than classical BSE is unlikely to be informative. Because of these uncertainties, it is an imperative to continue to carry out systematic surveillance of human TSE diseases, and to continue and improve the surveillance of animal TSE diseases.

The opinion highlights that the active screening has allowed the identification of 3 new forms of animal TSEs (L-type atypical BSE, H-type atypical BSE, and atypical scrapie), but that the information obtained has major limitations due to the unknown sensitivity of the current monitoring system for these TSEs.

There is no epidemiological evidence to suggest that classical scrapie is zoonotic. The epidemiological data are too limited to conclude whether the atypical scrapie agent has a zoonotic potential.

Transmission experiments to human PrP transgenic mice suggest that some TSE agents other than the classical BSE agent in cattle (namely L-type atypical BSE and classical BSE in sheep agents) might have zoonotic potential, whereas for other agents there is no evidence provided of a zoonotic potential (H-type atypical BSE and CWD), or no published studies are available (classical and atypical scrapie). In addition, transmission experiments to primates suggest that some TSE agents other than the classical BSE agent in cattle (namely L-type atypical BSE, classical BSE in sheep, TME, CWD agents) might have zoonotic potential. In particular, primates are highly permissive to L-type atypical BSE, even by the oral route.

The opinion emphasizes that laboratory transmission experiments indicate that the L-type atypical BSE agent has a significant zoonotic potential, which appears similar or even higher than that of the classical BSE agent. While transmission data for evaluating the zoonotic potential of classical scrapie in primates and human PrP transgenic mice are extremely limited or not yet available, a single study reported efficient transmission of a natural sheep classical scrapie isolate to primates.

The opinion concludes that human PrP transgenic mice and primates are currently the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier, but the extent to which such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. It is unpredictable whether a TSE agent will transmit to a new host, and if the transmission principally occurs, what the transmission rate will be.

Based on the results obtained with in vitro conversion assays, the opinion concludes that there is probably no absolute molecular barrier to transmission of TSE agents between mammalian species. Results also suggest that these assays may be developed as a tool for quantifying the transmission barriers between species for different TSE agent strains; however, there is no means at the moment to transpose in vitro results into the likelihood of in vivo interspecies transmission.

-- Communicated by: Terry S Singeltary Sr

[ProMED-mail thanks Terry S Singeltary Sr for drawing attention to this comprehensive document which provides a current evaluation of experimental work designed to explore the zoonotic potential of the various recently recognised TSEs of domestic and other animals.

It is concluded that at present the only TSE agent demonstrated to be zoonotic is the classical BSE agent. Nor can it be entirely excluded at the present time that a small proportion of cases of sporadic CJD may be environmentally acquired. - Mod.CP]

******

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1202:888892554804923::NO::F2400_P1202_CHECK_DISPLAY,F2400_P1202_PUB_MAIL_ID:X,88784



[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:


"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf



http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101




14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf


Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

Top Curr Chem (2011)

DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html



TSS

layperson

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net

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